1. INTRODUCTION How many ways can one approach a First Amendment analysis? What influences a lawyer or a judge to select one analytical approach over another? And what is the long-term effect of a court's choice of one over another? In Bartnicki v. Vopper/ a 2001 case in which the U.S. Supreme Court considered federal and state statutes prohibiting the disclosure of illegally intercepted telephone conversations,2 we are privileged to have a small laboratory through which to study the first two questions. And, from the vantage point of ten years, we ought to be able to make some informed predictions as to the third.
In Bartnicki, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment gave the news media a right to publish truthful information on matters of public concern, even if unlawfully acquired, provided the publisher did not participate in the unlawful conduct. 3 How the Court ultimately reached that conclusion is one principal focus of this Article, precisely because the story of this litigation reveals so much about alternative First Amendment analyses and the process of influencing the courts' choices among them.
In this one case, the district court framed the issue as a battle between conflicting and potentially controlling precedents. 4 The circuit court
• Eric B. Easton is Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore School of Law. I 532 U.8. 514(2001).
action for not only the interception, but also the further disclosure of the intercepted conversation. 13 In declaring the disclosure provision unconstitutional as applied, however, the Court declined to abstract its holding to a legal principle. The ambiguity of the decision suggests that a different balance could be struck if the subject matter of the disclosure were, say, national security rather than labor relations matters. The conclusion of this Article looks to the contemporary WikiLeaks.com controversy to illuminate this issue , 14 Part II of this Article recounts the underlying facts of the Bartnicki case and its procedural posture up to certiorari. Part III examines the two contending precedents initially asserted by the parties and accepted as the basis for analysis in the district court. Part IV looks at the shift to doctrinal analysis in the court of appeals, prompted at least in part by the federal government's entry into the case. Part V studies the proceedings before the U.S. Supreme Court, with emphasis on the participation and analytical approach of prominent media lawyers. Part VI dissects the opinion and the shift to an ad hoc balancing approach, particularly in light of the press arguments, while Part VII ventures some predictions about the significance of the decision with the WikiLeaks.com controversy as a backdrop.
From mid-1992 until November 1993, the district was tom by a contract dispute between the Wyoming Valley West School Board and the Wyoming Valley West Education Association, the union representing the district's 341 teachers. 18 Five months of hard bargaining for a new teachers' contract turned nasty in October 1992, when the board decided to warn teachers that they might be subject to furlough a week before the next scheduled bargaining session. 19 By March 1993, the teachers had halted all volunteer work, including chaperoning school activities/o and in May the union threatened to strike in early June unless their salary demands were met. 21 The union was asking for six percent increases each year for the next three years, raising the average salary from $40,000 to $47,640 in 1994. 22 The board was standing firm at three percent per year for three years?3 The teachers' health insurance plan was also in dispute?4 At 10:30 p.m. on May 27, 1993, the union delivered a strike notice to the home of Superintendent Dr. Norman Namey/5 and on June 4, the teachers launched their first strike in the twenty-seven-year history of the district. 26 The timing of that strike was the subject of one particular cellular telephone conversation between Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony Kane, Jr., 18 But it was another remark by Kane that captured the attention of the public-and the legal system-when the conversation was broadcast several months later: "If they're [the School Directors] not going to move for three percent (3%), we're gonna have to go to their, their homes ... to blow off their front porches, we'll have to do some work on some of those guys .... ,,30 How the public came to know of this conversation forms the factual predicate of this case.
The contentious contract negotiations prompted the formation of a citizens' group called the Wyoming Valley West Taxpayers' Association to oppose the teachers' union proposals?l Sometime after the conversation took place, still during the spring of 1993, the president of that organization, Jack Yocum, allegedly found a five-minute tape of the conversation in his mailbox. 32 Yocum claimed not to know who made the tape or why,33 but he listened to it, identified the voices, played it for some school board members, and gave copies of the tape to Frederick W. Vopper. 34 Vopper had a news and public affairs talk show under the name "Fred Williams" that was broadcast on WILK Radio and simulcast on WGBI-AM. 35 By all accounts, Vopper did nothing with the tape until late September. 36 By then, contract negotiations had completely broken down, the dispute had been submitted to non-binding arbitration, the arbitrator had sided with the teachers' union, and the school board had rejected the 27 A transcript of the conversation between Bartnicki and Kane was prepared by WILK Radio, one of the defendants in Barrnicki v. Vopper, and a copy of the transcript is attached to the Media Defendants' answer (29a-30a) and their motion for summary judgment, as Exhibit "A" (315a-326a). Amended Brief of Appellants at 8, Bartnicki v The media defendants filed their answer in September. 50 The following February, they consented to the plaintiffs' amending their complaint to add Yocum as a defendant. 51 Yocum answered on June 30, 1995. 52 After extensive discovery, the plaintiffs and the defendants moved for summary judgment, with both defendants asserting a First Amendment right to disclose the conversation. 53 By Memorandum and Order dated June 17, 1996, the District Court denied both motions, ruling that the circumstances of the interception and the defendants' knowledge of them represented genuine issues of material fact, but that imposing liability on the defendants would not violate the First Amendment.
54
The court denied the defendants' subsequent motion to reconsider in November, and in January 1998, the court certified that its orders were appealable. 55 On January 14, the media defendants filed an appeal in the 47 55 Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note 27, at 2, 1998 WL 34082380, at *2. The court ruled that the orders denying summary judgment "involved controlling questions of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal ... will materially advance the ultimate determination of this litigation." Id. at 5,1998 WL 34082380, at *5. As articulated by the Third Circuit, those questions were:
(1) whether the imposition of liability on the media Defendants under the [wiretapping statutes] solely for broadcasting the newsworthy tape on the Defendant Fred Williams' radio news/public affairs program, when the tape was illegally intercepted and recorded by unknown persons who were not agents of the Defendants, violates the First Amendment; and (2) whether imposition of liability under the aforesaid [wiretapping statutes] on Defendant Jack Yocum solely for providing the anonymously intercepted and recorded tape to the media Defendants violates the First Amendment. In his motion for summary judgment, Brobst had argued for the media defendants that Bartnicki and Kane could not prove that their telephone conversation had been illegally-that is, intentionally and not inadvertently-intercepted, or that Vopper knew or had reason to know that the telephone conversation was illegally intercepted. 64 He also argued that Bartnicki had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation, which took place on a cellular telephone that she acknowledged was susceptible to interception. 65 Brobst later conceded that neither of these factual arguments was persuasive, and that he staked everything on the First Amendment argument from the beginning. which Landmark belongs. Those cases held that "where the media lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance or concern, government officials may not constitutionally punish the publication of that information absent the need to further a government interest of a higher order.'.68 Brobst later said he focused on Landmark in particular because the governmental interests there-maintaining the reputation of the judges and the institutional integrity of the courts-were far greater than the privacy interests protected in this case. 69 To U.S. District Court Judge Edwin M. Kosik, however, the Bartnicki case essentially countered Brobst's Landmark rule with another wellestablished First Amendment principle: that "generally applicable laws 'do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news. ",70 Judge Kosik referred to this principle as the Cohen doctrine after Cohen v. Cowles Media, the only case cited for that proposition in his opinion/I despite its much earlier origins.72 A closer examination of the two conflicting precedents follows.
A. The Constitutional Privacy Cases
The genesis of the notion that plaintiffs ought to be able to recover for an invasion of their privacy was an 1890 Harvard Law Review article by Louis Brandeis and his law partner Samuel Warren. 73 The concept did not exist in English common law, and invasion of privacy is often called the only truly American tort. Dean William L. Prosser's classification scheme for the American common law privacy torts included misappropriation of name or likeness, publicity in a false light, intrusion on seclusion, and disclosure of private facts. 74 Apart from the five cases that substantively parallel the tort of disclosure of private facts-which are the central focus will variously reference this line, and the principle derived from it, as the Landmark, Daily Mail, or Florida Star rule or principle. 68 77 Of far greater importance, however, was the series of five privacyrelated cases that reached the Court between 1975 and 1989. None of these cases directly implicated the tort of public disclosure of private facts; the press rarely lost those cases in the state courts because of an absolute "newsworthiness" defense that was said to have "swallowed" the tort itself. The cases that did get to the Court, however, were all based, directly or indirectly, on statutes that criminalized the publication of truthful, but embarrassing, information. Sometimes they were characterized as prior restraints, sometimes as subsequent punishment.
On August 18, 1971, Cynthia Leslie Cohn, seventeen, was raped and suffocated to death by six high school boys following a drinking party in Sandy Springs, Fulton County, Georgia. 78 In April 1972, when the six perpetrators were arraigned, five pled guilty to rape-the murder charges against them having been dropped-and a date was set for the trial of the youth who pled not guilty.79 A reporter covering the case for WSB-TV duly broadcast the story later that day, including, for the first time in any media, the name of the victim. 80 The reporter had learned the name from personal observation of the proceedings and from the indictments, which were public records available to anyone who asked. 81 The next month, Martin Cohn, Cynthia Cohn's father, filed a lawsuit against the Cox Broadcasting Corp., the owner of WSB-TV, for invasion of privacy and for violating a Georgia statute that prohibited the publication or broadcasting of the name of any rape victim. 82
The trial court held that the statute gave Cohn a private right of action against Cox, notwithstanding the broadcaster's constitutional claims, and granted Cohn summary judgment as to liability, with damages to be considered at a later jury trial. 83 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the statute did not give Cohn a private right of action, so summary judgment was inappropriate, but also that Cohn's common law invasion of privacy claim was not precluded by the First Amendment. 84 On a motion for rehearing, the state supreme court held that the statute was an authoritative declaration of state policy to the effect that the name of a rape victim was not a matter of public concern, so the right to disclose that information was not protected by the First Amendment.
8s The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn. 86 Writing for a nearly unanimous Court-only Justice Rehnquist dissented-Justice White got to the heart of the matter. "Because the gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of information, whether true or not, the dissemination of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful to an individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and press.,,87 Determined to approach the constitutional balance cautiously, Justice White largely restricted his holding to the facts at hand. The state may not, he wrote, "impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from public records-more specifically, from judicial records which are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and which themselves are open to public inspection. ,,88 If the state wanted to keep such information from the press, the Court said, it would have to find some way to avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information, possibly by sealing court records containing such facts. 89 Only Justice Douglas would have ruled on broader grounds: that "there is no power on the part of government to suppress or penalize the publication of 'news of While only regional media companies participated in the Cox case, the next privacy case to reach the Court drew the attention of the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA). Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court in and for Oklahoma County was not a tort case at all,92 but rather challenged an injunction issued by the county court prohibiting the news media from "publishing, broadcasting, or disseminating, in any manner, the name or picture" of an eleven-year-old boy alleged to have shot and killed a railroad switchman. 93 Reporters were able to learn his name and take his photograph during and after an open detention hearing, and they used both in the newspaper, radio, and television stories that followed. 94 A few days later, when the boy appeared in court again for arraignment, the judge closed the proceeding and issued the injunction. 95 On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the judge's order, but the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the order. 96 It granted certiorari and, in the same per curiam opinion, reversed. 97
As if to illustrate the relationship between prior restraint and privacy cases, the Court, relying on both Cox and Nebraska Press v. Stuart,98 held that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not permit a state court to prohibit the publication of widely disseminated information obtained at court proceedings which were in fact open to the public.,,99 The Court's very brief opinion closely tracked the arguments made by ANP A in its amicus brief, but did not follow ANPA's suggestion for a general rule to avoid "a constant stream of minor fact variations which will needlessly take up the time of this Court and ofthe press in preventing encroachments upon the First and Fourteenth Amendments by trial judges who do not yet believe or perhaps understand the teachings of this Court . . . . ,,100 The Court 90 Id at 501 (Douglas, 1., concurring). 91 Id at 501 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam)
. 93 Id at 308-{)9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 94 continued to resist formulating a broad, general rule in the next privacyrelated case the following year.
On October 4, 1975, Landmark's Virginian-Pilof published an article that accurately reported on a pending inquiry by the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission and identified the state judge whose conduct was being investigated. 101 A month later, a grand jury indicted Landmark for violating a state statute by ''unlawfully divulg[ing] the identification of a Judge of a Court not of record, which said Judge was the subject of an investigation and hearing" by the Commission.
102 Landmark was convicted of a misdemeanor in a bench trial and fined $500. 103 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, citing the need to protect the judge's reputation from the publicity that might attend frivolous claims; preserve public confidence in the judicial system; and protect complainants and witnesses before the Commission.
I04 Landmark appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. \05 In contrast to Cox and even Oklahoma Publishing, Landmark attracted the attention of a substantial number of media companies and press associations. \06 The media companies argued that under the Constitution, none of the purported interests cited by the Virginia Supreme Court could be protected by imposing criminal sanctions on the press and calling for a rule barring accurate reports of government affairs. 107 The press associations similarly argued that the Constitution barred states from imposing criminal sanctions for publishing information on the public duties of public officials. \08 As before, the Court shied away from any generalized pronouncement. Writing for a nearly unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger found it "unnecessary to adopt this categorical approach to resolve the issue.,,109 He continued:
The narrow and limited question presented, then, is whether the First Amendment permits the criminal punishment of third persons who are strangers to the inquiry, including the news media, for divulging or publishing truthful information regarding confidential proceedings of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. We are not here concerned with the possible applicability of the statute to one who secures the information by illegal means and thereafter divulges it.
... We conclude that the publication Virginia seeks to punish under its statute lies near the core of the First Amendment, and the Commonwealth's interests advanced by the imposition of criminal sanctions are insufficient to justify the actual and potential encroachments on freedom of speech and of the press which follow therefrom. 110 Even without propounding the general rule sought by the press, the Court had, in these three cases, begun to make clear that privacy interestsincluding the name of a rape victim, a juvenile offender, or even a judge merely accused of wrongdoing-would not be enough to overcome the presumptive right of the press to publish truthful information, lawfully acquired, on matters of public concern, even if the publication was otherwise prohibited by a state's legislature or its courts. I II In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Court would make that rule explicit. I 12
The 1979 case, like Oklahoma Publishing, involved an indictment against two West Virginia newspapers for violating state law by publishing, without a court's permission, the name of a fourteen-year-old who had shot and killed a high school classmate.113 In this case, however, the reporters did not obtain the name in open court, but by monitoring the police band radio frequency, going to the scene, and interviewing witnesses, police, and a prosecutor.11 4 The papers sought and won a writ of prohibition against prosecution from the West Virginia Supreme Court, which held that prosecution would be unconstitutional under recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, but the attorney general of West Virginia filed a successful 2011]
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petition for certiorari on behalf of the trial judge, Robert K. Smith." s Once again, the press amici came out in force to support the newspapers." 6 Once again, the ACLU added its voice to that of the press. 117 Once again, Floyd Abrams, who had represented Landmark Communications, was representing the newspaper. 118 Once again, the Chief Justice wrote the opinion for a nearly unanimous COurt.
119
Because of the language of the statute requiring a court order before publishing the name of a juvenile offender, the press amici tended to characterize the statute as a prior restraint-even though the information had already been published and the case reached the Court through a criminal prosecution. 120 Chief Justice Burger agreed after a fashion:
Whether we view the statute as a prior restraint or as a penal sanction for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful information is not dispositive because even the latter action requires the highest form of state interest to sustain its validity. Prior restraints have been accorded the most exacting scrutiny in previous cases. However, even when a state attempts to punish publication after the event it must nevertheless demonstrate that its punitive action was necessary to further the state interests asserted. Since we conclude that this statute cannot satisfy the constitutional standards defined in Landmark Communications, Inc., we need not decide whether,
as argue y respon ents, It operate as a pnor restramt.
But Chief Justice Burger went further and gave the press the general rule it had been seeking. He pointed out that in the previous cases-Cox, Oklahoma Publishing, and Landmark Communications-the press received the information from the government or government sources, so those cases did not directly control the outcome here, where the press gathered the information through routine reporting techniques. previously been arrested for unlawful assembly and petit theft.142 The unlawful assembly charges, which grew out of a civil rights demonstration, were ultimately dismissed. 143 The candidate had been convicted on the theft charge, which involved a minor shoplifting offense while she had been emotionally distraught, but the conviction was later vacated. 144
Editors at both the Pioneer Press and the Star Tribune independently decided to print the story and, over their reporters' protests, to include the name of the source. 145 While the Pioneer Press editors buried Dan Cohen's name deep in the story, the Star Tribune editors featured it, apparently reasoning that the value of the story, if any, lay in Cohen's conduct, not Johnson's.146 The Star Tribune also attacked Cohen in its editorial pages, but neither paper reported that it had broken a promise of confidentiality with Cohen.147
Cohen lost his job when the story broke/ 48 and later sued the newspapers' publishers alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract. 149 Overcoming the publishers' First Amendment claims, Cohen won $200,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages at trial. 150 The Minnesota Court of Appeals struck down the punitive damage award after finding that Cohen had failed to establish a fraud claim. 151 The Minnesota Supreme Court struck down the compensatory damage award, holding a contract action "inappropriate" under the circumstances. 152
During oral argument before the Minnesota Supreme Court, one of the justices had asked a question about estoppel, a cause of action in equity that might serve as an alternative to Cohen's contract claim in enforcing the reporters' promises.
153 Addressing that issue in its opinion, the court found it necessary to "balance the constitutional rights of a free press against the 142 Cohen, 50\ u.s. at 665. 143 Id. 144 Id. at 665-66. 145 Id. at 666. 146 Salisbury, supra note 139, at 2\-22. 147 Id.
148 Cohen said he was fired, and that position was adopted by the Supreme Court. Cohen, 50\ U.S. at 666. According to Salisbury, his supervisor said he resigned. Salisbury, supra note \39, at 22. common law interest in protecting a promise of anonymity." 154 In this case, the court said, enforcing the promise would violate the newspapers' First Amendment rightS.155 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider the First Amendment implications of this case.,,156
Writing for a five-to-four majority,157 Justice White rejected the newspapers' argument that this case was controlled by the line of cases holding that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.,,158 Instead, Justice White said, the case was controlled "by the equally well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.,,159
Justice White proceeded to list a number of cases-starting with Branzburg v. Hayes
I6°-purporting to demonstrate that enforcement of general laws against the press is not subject to any stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations. 161 Finding Minnesota's doctrine of promissory estoppel just such a "law of general applicability," Justice White had no problem applying it to the press. 162 He even suggested that the newspapers' breaking their promises might serve as a predicate for finding their conduct unlawful, thus arguably negating First Amendment protection for the information itself. his reputation or state of mind, but rather for the loss of his job and his lowered earning capacity. 165 Finally, Justice White tackled the argument that allowing the promissory estoppel claim would inhibit the press from disclosing the identity of a confidential source when, as in Cohen, that information is newsworthy.166 If true, he said, the "chilling effect" would be "no more than the incidental, and constitutionally insignificant, consequence of applying to the press a generally applicable law that requires those who make certain kinds of promises to keep them.,,167
Writing
White's reliance on the doctrine of "generally applicable laws," denying any "talismanic" quality in such laws.I7O Justice Souter would have found the state's interest in protecting the promise of confidentiality insufficient to outweigh the value of the information revealed in this case. 171 Nevertheless, the case was remanded to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which reversed its previous position and held the newspapers liable for Cohen's damages on a theory of promissory estoppel. 172
In his account of this case, Cohen's lawyer, Elliot Rothenberg, called the decision "the worst defeat the media had ever suffered in the Supreme COurt.,,173 Even allowing for some self-indulgent boasting, Rothenberg was not far off the mark.174 How had the press blown such a big one? Clearly, there was no lack of legal talent applied to the case. Both newspapers brought in new legal teams for the Supreme Court contest-"heavy Nor were the press's arguments off track. Indeed, they paralleled, if not influenced, the arguments of the four dissenting Justices.
179 Apart from Rothenberg himself, there was no outstanding opposition to the press's position; heavy hitters like the United States and the ACLU did not have a dog in the hunt, and even those in or involved with the media who thoroughly disapproved of the newspapers' conduct stayed out of the Supreme Court action.
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to identify reasons why the press lost this case. Arguably, the case should have ended with the first state supreme court opinion; the state court rejected Cohen's contract claim and Cohen had not raised promissory estoppel. I80 The First Amendment question, essential to getting the case to the U.s. Supreme Court, need never have been reached. 18I Timing, too, was a problem for the press. Justice Brennan retired just before the case was heard, and although his successor, Justice Souter, also supported the press's position, Justice Brennan's voice would have been a far more powerful counterweight to Justice White's hostility. But perhaps the most serious problem of all was the nature of the case itself and the dissention it engendered within the media establishment.
It was, after all, in the nature of Cohen that the press was forced to argue that promises of confidentiality to sources were not serious enough to be considered contracts without weakening the central argument in Branzburg that such promises deserved constitutional protection. 183 If not altogether untenable, the press's position was at best precarious. It was also highly contentious. Rothenberg quotes University of Minnesota journalism professor Ted Glasser as characterizing the trial as more "between reporters and editors" than between plaintiffs and defendants,184 and urging reporters to oppose the newspapers in any appeal. Glasser wrote:
To claim to have a First Amendment right to renege on a reporter's promise not only places the press above the law but denies reporters the very freedom they need to operate in the day-to-day world of journalism. Reporters have every reason to file a friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of Cohen. 18S
There was no reporters' brief at any level, and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press was not a signatory to the press's amicus brief. The Washington Post also declined to join, as did a number of other media companies who might otherwise have been expected to participate. 186 Rothenberg'S petition for certiorari had capitalized on that dissention by quoting star media lawyer Floyd Abrams calling the newspapers' conduct in breaking their reporters' promises of confidentiality "reprehensible and damaging to all journalists.,,187 Shortly before the decision came down, Abrams again spoke out publicly in a speech and op-ed column, charging that:
[The newspapers] acted in a fashion contrary to core principles of journalistic ethics. They also invited the lawsuit now awaiting decision by the Supreme Court, one that offers enemies of the press a particularly inviting target. What the Minnesota newspapers did was wrong; they should have said so. Why is any defender of the press unwilling to say as much?188 183 There is no direct evidence that the division within the press over the Cohen case had a significant or even marginal influence on the outcome. Nor was there any direct evidence that differences among media organizations played a significant role in the Court's rejection of constitutional protection for confidential sources in Branzburg v. Hayes, although those differences certainly weakened the campaign for federal shield legislation. There is no doubt, however, that the two most important news gathering cases ever to reach the u.s. Supreme Court did not show the press in the best light as a constitutional litigator.
C. The District Court Opinion
For the district court, the conflict between Landmark and Cohen was easily resolved. According to the court, Landmark only applies where "a state actor attempted to place a prior restraint on specified speech or where the intentional interception was legal but the disclosure was illegal.,,189 Here, the court said without further explanation, "there exist no statutory provisions specifically designed to chill free speech.,,190 Thus finding Landmark inapplicable, the court went on to find Cohen controlling. "In reviewing both the federal and the state electronic surveillance laws, we conclude that both acts are matters of general applicability.,,191
In his motion for reconsideration, Brobst argued that the court's reliance on Cohen was misplaced and that Landmark did not involve a prior restraint.
ln The Virginia statute at issue in Landmark was "generally applicable" and did not "single out the press," yet the Supreme Court reversed the newspaper owner's conviction on First Amendment grounds. 193 This case, Brobst argued, is indistinguishable. 194 Moreover, he said, by breaking its promise to Cohen, the press arguably obtained its information unlawfully; here, there was no question that the press obtained its information lawfully from Yocum, whatever might have happened earlier. 195 Perhaps recognizing that engaging in a serious analysis of the issue before it on a motion for summary judgment was probably a waste of A21). [W]e didn't have much [in the way of another] defense in this case. They had us dead to rights on what we did. We clearly had broadcast the tape many times. There was no doubt about that. It was pretty hard for us to claim that we didn't know that it had been a surreptitiously recorded tape. 198 In fact, Brobst said:
[W]e had a settlement agreement with the other side ... that the outcome of the appeal would decide the outcome of the case because there was no sense going to trial .... If we win [on the constitutional issue], we don't have to pay them anything, obviously, and if they win, it was a fixed amount of money that we would pay them. 199 While the agreement reserved the right of either party to petition the Supreme Court for review, Brobst said neither side really expected the case to go that far. 2°O
N. CIRCUIT COURT: APPLYING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
On appeal, the parties agreed that no factual issues barred the Third Circuit from resolving the legal issues/o 1 which boiled down to one: Does the First Amendment bar the imposition of liability for publishing truthful information of public significance, where both the acquisition and publication of that information are prohibited by statute and where the publisher was not involved in the unlawful acquisition?202 196 
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As might be expected, the appellants continued to rely on the Landmark doctrine and related cases, asserting that the government's interest in the privacy of cellular telephone communications is "significantly less[]" than the interest at stake in Landmark. 203 The appellants also cited a remarkably similar case in which the u.s. District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled that the First Amendment protected the press from civil liability for reporting the contents of an illegally recorded telephone conversation of a school board trustee, where the tape had been recorded anonymously, delivered to certain school board members, and played at a public school board meeting. 204 Perhaps even more interesting was the appellants' attempt to distinguish Cohen by reciting many of the arguments used against the media companies in that case: that the newspapers determined the scope of their own legal obligations by contract, that any restriction on publication was thus self-imposed, and that the newspapers may not have acted lawfully in acquiring the information by reneging on a promise of confidentiality.205 The appellants also argued that the impact of enforcing the disclosure provisions of the wiretapping statutes would be far greater than "incidental," as required to impose the Cohen doctrine?06
The appellees framed the case as a contest between the Landmark and Cohen principles, although of course they asserted that Cohen applied to this case. 207 The appellees also found a similar case in which a state trial court had distinguished the Landmark line on two grounds: (1) that the information in those cases had been properly part of the public record, albeit protected by statutory confidentiality; and (2) that the information in the case had been a private conversation, rather than governmental records. 208 That case never mentioned the Cohen doctrine at all, but the appellees devoted a section to amplifying the district court's assertions. 209 The appellees added some new arguments as well. First, they asserted that the Landmark-related holdings were very narrow and limited to their specific facts?1O Specifically, the appellees pointed to the famous footnote eight in Florida Star in which the Court declined to address the question of "unlawfully" acquired information,211 suggesting the appellants' reliance on those cases was therefore "misplaced.,, 212 The appellants, of course, would find that footnote irrelevant, since they committed no unlawful act in acquiring the information.
But even if the strict scrutiny of Landmark controlled, the appellees argued, the wiretapping statutes would pass muster because they were narrowly tailored to protect privacy rights of the highest order.
213 Drawing on legislative history, the appellees asserted that Congress was aware of and increasingly concerned about the impact of modem communications technology on personal privacy and the law's failure to keep up with that technology. 214 Appellant Yocum had claimed the status of news-gatherer in his lessthan-coherent brief to the Third Circuit, citing Branzburg v. Hayes for the proposition that he was therefore entitled to First Amendment protection.
215
The appellees pointed out that, if anything, Branzburg stands for the proposition that news-gatherers enjoy very limited protection, supporting their argument based on the Cohen principle, and that in any case, Yocum's case would succeed or fail on the same grounds as the other appellants' case?16
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The only amicus brief in the Third Circuit was filed by the PSEA on behalf of the appellees, and that brief largely echoed the appellees' analysis. It raised-and criticized-another new decision based on similar facts,217 and it added another argument analogizing the imposition of civil liability for violation of copyright law and for violation of the wiretap law's disclosure provisions.218 Two aspects of the PSEA brief, however, bear mention because of their emphasis in the government's brief and the Third Circuit opinion. Unlike either the district court opinion or the appellees' brief, the PSEA brief put particular emphasis on the wiretap statute's prohibition of "use[s)" of the intercepted materials other than disclosure to show its more general applicabiliryl19 and characterized the Landmark line as involving "heightened scrutiny" dependent upon the lawfulness of the information's initial acquisition. 220 Both of these arguments would be substantially amplified in the federal government's brief and addressed, albeit negatively for the most part, in the Third Circuit opinion.
There were no amicus briefs supporting Vopper's position. Brobst does not know why there was no support from other media organizations at this stage-"they certainly would have been aware of the case"-but he acknowledges that he did not solicit any amicus briefs from those organizations. 221 Given the outcome in the Third Circuit, there was no apparent need for such support.
Following oral argument before the Third Circuit, the United States filed a brief-signed by the Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department's Civil Division, the U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and two staff appellate attorneys-defending the constitutionality of the wiretap statute's disclosure provision against the appellants' as-applied challenge. 222 Under federal law, the United States has the right to defend the constitutionality of any federal statute challenged on constitutional grounds.223 Although Brobst argued that his "as-applied" challenge did not rise to that level/ 24 the Third Circuit saw the case 314 
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[Vol. 50:287 otherwise and immediately after the argument duly issued a letter inviting the government to file a post-argument brief in the case.225 The government's brief points out that its filing was both "at the invitation of the Court" and pursuant to its motion to intervene as of right under the law to defend the constitutionality of the wiretap statute.
226
The United States can be something of an 800-pound gorilla when it litigates or intervenes in a constitutional challenge.
227 In an analysis of twenty-four Supreme Court decisions in which the press litigated against the federal government, the press won only eight--or 33.3%.228 In this case, the United States framed the issue less in terms of competing precedents, as the parties had done, than in terms of levels of First Amendment scrutiny to be applied.229 The Third Circuit's opinion would track the government's approach.
Following a focused description ofthe wiretap statute allegedly violated by Vopper, and a synopsis of the proceeding thus far, the government summarized its argument: the First Amendment does not prohibit the application of the wiretap statute's "use prohibitions" to the defendants in this case. 230 As applied, those provisions are "subject only to intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment, rather than strict scrutiny, and the statute readily satisfies the requirements of intermediate scrutiny.,.231 Thus, one argument among others suggested in the PSEA brief had become the foundation for the government's position.
The government argued that the statute's ban on disclosure had to be read as part of a comprehensive ban on all uses of intercepted material; thus, the prohibition did not single out speech for any special burden.232 Where that is so, where any burden on speech is merely incidental to the purpose of the law, First Amendment precedent dictates the application of intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny in determining its constitutionality.233 A statute satisfies intermediate scrutiny if it furthers an "important" or "substantial" governmental interest (in contrast to strict scrutiny's "compelling" interest); if that interest is unrelated to the 225 Brief for the United States, supra note 60, at 10, 1998 WL 34082480, at *10. 226 suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on speech is not unnecessarily great (in contrast to strict scrutiny's "no less restrictive alternative available,,).234 lntermediate scrutiny is also appropriate, the government said, where the prohibitions on the use of illegally intercepted communications are not related to the content of the cornmunications.235 Pointing out that the appellants would be free to broadcast the very same tape if acquired lawfully, the government noted that such content-neutral restrictions on speech also require courts to apply intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny in evaluating their constitutionality.236 The restrictions at issue in the Landmark line of cases asserted by the appellants required strict scrutiny because they singled out speech for special burdens and restricted speech because of its content, among other reasons. 237
Having established the appropriateness of intermediate scrutiny, the government then proceeded to show how the wiretap statute satisfied that standard. The privacy interest to be protected is "manifestly substantial." 238 Moreover, by protecting the confidentiality of communications, the regulations encourage, rather than suppress, free expression. 239 And, finally, the regulations are tailored carefully enough that they would even satisfy a strict scrutiny standard?40
It was a powerful argument, invoking not merely competing analogies, but basic principles of First Amendment analysis; indeed, the Third Circuit adopted just such an approach. Writing for herself and Judge Robert Cowan, Judge Dolores Sloviter rejected the appellants' argument that Landmark was controlling, noting that the question before the court had been expressly reserved by the Supreme Court. 241 "[W]e will resolve the present controversy not by mechanically applying a test gleaned from Cox and its progeny, but by reviewing First Amendment principles in light of the unique facts and circumstances of this case.,,242 But Judge Sloviter also rejected the district court's application of Cohen. Expressing some doubt that the wiretap statute's disclosure provision was a law of general applicability, she pointed out that even if it were, Cohen did not stand for 316 [Vol. 50:287 the proposition that laws of general applicability are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny. 243 Rather, the Supreme Court held only that "'enforcement of such general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations. ",244
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LA W REVIEW
As if to emphasize the importance of the United States as a party in this case, Judge Sloviter's analysis all but ignores the original parties and addresses the government's brief directly. Briefly summarizing its argument for intermediate scrutiny, Judge Sloviter proceeded to mock the government's assertion that the statute's ban on "disclosure" is merely an aspect of its ban on "use"-that is, conduct, rather than speech-and thus merited intermediate scrutiny.245 "A statute that prohibited the 'use' of evolution theory would surely violate the First Amendment if applied to prohibit the disclosure of Charles Darwin's writings .... ,,246
On the other hand, the court found the content-neutrality argument more persuasive, based on the Supreme Court's definition of contentneutral restrictions on speech as restrictions that "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.,,247 Had the Federal Wiretapping Act's only purpose been to prevent the disclosure of private facts, Judge Sloviter suggested, its content-neutrality might be doubted. 248 But the government did not rely on that justification; rather, she said, insofar as the Act's purpose was to deny the illegal interceptor a market for the "fruits of his labor," it was properly treated as content-neutral and intermediate scrutiny applied. 249
After reviewing various interpretations of the intermediate scrutiny standard, Judge Sloviter formulated the question before the court as "whether the government has shown that its proffered interest"-eliminating the demand for intercepted communications-is sufficiently furthered by imposing liability on the defendants in this case to justify the restrictions on their First Amendment interests. 25o Finding the connection "indirect at best," the court concluded that "it would be a long stretch indeed" to conclude that imposing damages here would even peripherally 
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promote the government's effort to deter interception. 251 Since the Act already provides punishment for illegal interception, it would be more effective to enforce those provisions than to impose liability here?52 Writing in dissent, District Judge Louis Pollak agreed with the majority's analytical approach to the case, but not with its application. Judge Pollak took issue with the court's assertion that the connection between prohibiting disclosure and preventing interception was "indirect at best," citing a recent decision, Boehner v. McDermott, from the u.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to the contrary.253 In that case, the court opined that, "[ u ]nless disclosure is prohibited, there will be an incentive for illegal interceptions; and ... the damage caused ... will be compounded.,,254 The majority distinguished Boehner on the ground that the newspapers reporting the intercepted conversation were not defendants in that case, and that defendant McDermott, who provided the tape to the newspapers, knew who had intercepted the conversation and had a political interest in its disclosure. 255 Following the judgment, Bartnicki and Kane moved for a rehearing by the entire Third Circuit court. According to Brobst, the motion failed by only one vote, suggesting the case was much closer than the panel decision would indicate. 256 v. BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: THE PRESS TAKES NOTICE
A. The Certiorari Process
On April 19, 2000, Bartnicki and Kane filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, asking the u.S. Supreme Court to review the Third Circuit decision.257 Their original lawyer, Wilkes-Barre attorney Raymond P. Wendolowski, was still listed on the brief supporting their petition/ 58 but with the stakes now that much higher and the venue shifting to Washington, Wendolowski was no longer listed as counsel of record. Taking a cue from the dissent below, Bartnicki argued that the Supreme Court should review the case because the Third Circuit decision conflicted with Boehner, setting up a conflict between two circuits that the Supreme Court ought to resolve. 263 That kind of argument is considered one of the most effective at this stage of the process; if four Justices agree that a conflict exists, the Court will invariably take the case. 264 Bartnicki also argued that the decision below not only struck down an important provision of a federal statute, but also called into question similar statutes enacted by a majority of the states?65 The Third Circuit majority had disparaged that argument as hyperbole when raised by the dissent, pointing out that its "as applied" decision was expressly limited to the facts of this case. 266 Finally, Bartnicki asserted that the Third Circuit opinion was just wrong as to an important question of constitutional law that had been reserved by the Supreme Court in prior decisions. 267 The petition asserted that the case provided "an ideal vehicle" for determining whether "a statute that protects privacy interests by making it unlawful for a person to disclose information unlawfully obtained by another violates the First Amendment .... ,,268 The following week, the United States weighed in, seeking certiorari on its own behalf as an intervenor in the case, with Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman listed as counsel ofrecord. 269 The government's argument closely paralleled Bartnicki's. 259 When Vopper' s brief in opposition to certiorari was filed on May 30, the radio host was also represented by new counsel. According to Donald Brobst, Vopper's employer-Keymarket of NEPA, the owner of radio stationWILK-had been acquired by Sinclair Broadcast Group sometime during the pendency of the case. 270 While Sinclair initially kept Brobst on as outside counsel, he had what he describes as a "falling out with in-house counsel for Sinclair that had nothing to do with this case,,,271 although part of the problem involved Fred Vopper.
Id
See Welcome to Bredhoff
In one case, Brobst said, Sinclair wanted him to defend Vopper in a case brought by a district attorney who also happened to be running for judicial office.
272 One of the Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald (RJG) partners was campaign treasurer, raising a potential conflict of interest for any lawyer in the firm. 273 Another case involved Vopper challenging the integrity of two judges before whom RJG had other cases pending. 274 Sinclair's in-house counsel was "not happy about that," Brobst said, and the relationship started to go downhill.275 After another, unrelated dispute arose, they "decided to have a parting of the ways on all cases,,,276 and Brobst lost the chance to take Bartnicki v v. Connaughton.278 Levine also taught media law at Georgetown University Law Center and co-authored a major treatise on newsgathering.
279 Brobst recalls that he had some initial contact with the new litigation team-"I sent them everything they wanted,,280 -then bowed out of the case.
Levine's brief in opposition to certiorari rejected all of the reasons for judicial review raised in the Bartnicki and United States petitions. The Third Circuit decision "constitutes an unremarkable assessment of whether the imposition of civil liability" on the media defendants under the Wiretap Act "survives intermediate scrutiny .... ,,281 "In making this fact-bound assessment," the brief asserted, "the Third Circuit expressly declined to address the 'important question of constitutional law' referenced by Petitioners, 'struck down' no provision of either statute, and applied the same standard of First Amendment scrutiny embraced by the majority of the District of Columbia Circuit in Boehner.,,282
Those arguments were echoed in respondent Yocum's brief in opposition/ 83 but successfully rebutted in reply briefs from Bartnicki 284 and the United States. 285 On June 26, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari?86
In contrast to the Third Circuit proceeding, amicus briefs began flowing into the Court in September; three of them were filed by litigants in cases representing nearly identical issues. Representative John Boehner (R-Ohio), whose victory in the D.C. Circuit had prompted Bartnicki's "split in the circuits" argument, argued for petitioners that "there is no First Amendment right to distribute someone else's pilfered speech.,,287 Boehner's opponent, Representative James McDermott (D-Washington), whose petition for certiorari was still pending at the time, argued that disclosure provisions of the wiretap statute should be subject to strict scrutiny.288 WFAA-TV of Dallas, Texas, which was poised to file its own petition seeking review of an adverse Fifth Circuit decision,z89 sought to push the Court to the ultimate rule-further than any other participant:
This case should be decided according to a simple, bright line rule: if a journalist breaks the law to obtain information, she is subject to whatever generally applicable legal penalties may be triggered by the act of misappropriation. However the journalist has obtained information, she may be punished only for any impropriety in obtaining it, and not for publishing it, absent a countervailing governmental interest of the highest order.
29o
Only one other amicus brief was filed on behalf of Bartnicki and Kane; the cellular telephone industry argued that ensuring the privacy of wireless communications would further federal policies favoring the free speech of cell phone subscribers and encouraging the industry's growth. law. It is impossible to say with any certainty how much influence any brief may have had on the Court, but the similarity between the media. entities' brief and the Court's majority opinion is striking.
B. The Amicus Brief Process
Before discussing the content of the various briefs filed with the Court, a brief digression is warranted to explore the process through which the media bar participates as amici curiae in Supreme Court litigation today. According to Lucy Dalglish, the Executive Director of the Reporters Committee on Freedom of the Press (RCFP), the process is an informal one?96 For example, the RCFP first got involved in the Bartnicki case in June 2000. 297 Legal defense director, Gregg Leslie, had put out an email message to a number of prominent media lawyers, among them Laura Handman of Davis Wright Tremaine, Bruce Sanford of Baker Hostetler, and Lee Levine, asking: Does anyone know of an amicus effort underway in Bartnicki? We've always been available to write one, or at least coordinate efforts, but I assume there will be big companies willing to pay a firm for a brief now that it's before the high court. If you have any information that you're available to share, I'd be happy to hear it.298
Soon after, Adam Liptak, then in-house counsel for the New York Times, now its Supreme Court reporter, replied, "Gregg, yes, there is an amicus effort. The Times and others have asked Floyd Abrams to prepare a brief and I'm sure the Reporters Committee will be welcome [to join the brief] on the usual terms.,,299 By "usual terms," Liptak was referring to the informal arrangement through which signatories to the brief help the lead organization (here, the Times) pay for it. The RCFP and other nonprofits usually ride along for free, and when the RCFP lawyers write the brief, all others in the media world are invited to join at no charge. 30o Typically, however, the private entities pay for the privilege. "It depends on how much time it's going to take, how many people [the lawyers] think need to do it. They've been cutting their rates a little bit lately. In the summertime, they want to do it more because they can use their summer associates if they have them. I'd say anywhere from $10,000 to $30,000 these days is what it would COSt.,,303 Once the cost is established, the lead organization would begin "trolling" for signers. 304 If, for example, the sign-on price is $1,500, Dalglish said, "[I]fyou get a whole pile of folks signing on, you're doing OK, but if you only get five, you've rolled the dice and you've lost.,,305
As to the content of the briefs, Dalglish said amici first figure out what the party they are supporting has already argued, then identify other issues that the party did not have room for. 306 "Usually, what we try to do is present a national perspective, do some public policy stuff, or brief an issue that the parties would have loved to have briefed if they had time or space. Sometimes they will ask you specifically, could you do this issue.,,307 Other times, amici will suggest the focus of the brief. In either event, amici will try to avoid simply repeating the party's arguments. "No court wants to put up with that," Dalglish said.
3og "I just have no interest in parroting back the party's brief.,,309
The relationship between amici and the parties varies somewhat depending upon the court hearing the case. Under Supreme Court ruies/ IO and throughout the federal system,3l1 all parties must consent to the filing of an amicus brief; where consent is withheld, amici may petition the court to receive the brief anyway. Thus, there is always some communication between the amici and the party they are supporting. Dalglish described the typical process: "You let them know you're going to do it, and they'll say 'Hey! Yeah, that would be great-wonderful. We'll sign the letter and give it to you. ",312 On the other hand, the Supreme Court rules require amici to disclose whether counsel for a party had a hand in writing the brief or paying for it. Dalglish said RCFP used to be a lot more involved in direct litigation, pointing out that "the last time we were actually actively involved as a party was ... when we went in with the Center for National Security Studies ... to get a list of the 1,500 or so foreign nationals who were snatched off the streets and put in detention centers" after Sept. 11, 2001 . 327 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ultimately reversed an initially favorable decision by the district COurt.328 During the past decade or so, since Dalglish has been executive director, the RCFP has been doing more amicus briefs.
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"We look for cases that will have the potential to have an impact on what journalists are able to do, either in their home state or on the federal level, and that can be in regards to an open meetings or open records violation.,,33o "It can be getting involved in a libel case, or certainly in a reporter's privilege case. We tend not to get involved at the trial level," Dalglish said, citing lack of need, cost, and the potential to irritate trial judges.331 "That's not to say we haven't done it, but at the trial court level we usually try to get involved if it is an issue that can be of great relevance 324 Although the Third Circuit had viewed the government's interest in deterring unlawful interceptions as the most, albeit insufficiently, compelling justification for the statute's non-disclosure provisions, Abrams focused on the privacy interest. 347 The privacy interests held insufficient in the Florida Star line of cases, he said, were no less powerful than the privacy interests in this case. 348 Abrams asked, "[W]hy, after all, is the right of a rape victim not to have her name disclosed less significant than that of a union official not to have a telephone call disclosed in which he threatened to engage in criminal conduct?,, 349 Abrams moved on to reject the notion, advanced by Bartnicki, that the Florida Star line of cases was limited to content-based restrictions on speech and, thus, not appiicable to the content-neutral disclosure restrictions of the wiretap laws. 35o Rather, he said, that line of authority is firmly grounded in the public interest in truth-telling.35I Abrams also made the seemingly unnecessary argument that the media defendants acted lawfully in obtaining the tape,352 then returned to balance of privacy and truth-telling interests. 353 In the very last paragraph of the argument, almost as an afterthought, Abrams struck the precise theme that would dominate the Supreme Court's opinion:
We offer the final thought that there is, in the end, a certain lack of equivalence between the First Amendment interests at stake here and the privacy interests that underlie the wiretapping statute. Both are important but only one is in the written Constitution. It should not be too late to assert that when the First Amendment's protection of truth-telling is pitted against an interest that was only first identified just over a century ago, some deference should be given to the Framer's expressed intentions. 354 Oral arguments were held on December 5, 2000. 355 Collins led off for petitioners Bartnicki , Justice Stevens adopted the frame that Abrams had urged-a conflict between the "full and free dissemination of information concerning public issues" and "individual privacy.,,373 Justice Stevens's formulation of the issue, however, labeled both interests "of the highest order," and he appeared to accept the idea, advanced by the petitioners, that the disclosure provisions of the statute would "foster[] private speech.,,374 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens promptly declared that the disclosures made in this case were protected by the First Amendment. 375
The opinion that followed was unusually disjointed, shifting from doctrinal analysis, to interrogation of precedents, and ultimately to ad hoc balancing. Justice Stevens began by accepting the petitioners' characterization of the disclosure provisions as a "content-neutral law of general applicability.,,376 Unlike the trial court, however, he did not find that dispositive. "On the other hand," he said, "the naked prohibition against disclosures is fairly characterized as a regulation of pure speech,,,377 as if that somehow negated or counterbalanced the general applicability doctrine as applied in Cohen v. Cowles Media.
378
Seeming to reach a dead end with this doctrinal inquiry, Justice Stevens shifted abruptly to interrogating precedent. 379 Here, too, the analysis ended The only lesson Justice Stevens seemed to take from these precedents was the need to balance, on the facts of this case, the interests served by the law against its restrictions on speech.
Like the Third Circuit, Justice Stevens ultimately rejected the government's asserted interest in deterring interception of private conversations as a bona fide interest of the "highest order.,,383 Unlike the Third Circuit, he found the privacy interest compromised here to be a "valid independent justification for prohibiting such disclosures . . . .,,384 Nevertheless, those privacy interests had to "give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.,,385 Drawing principally on libel cases for support, Justice Stevens held that a "stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concem.,,386
In a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice Stephen Breyer emphasized the narrowness of the Court's holding. 387 Justice Breyer, well known for his ad hoc balancing approach to First Amendment cases,388 cautioned that this case was decided on the facts that the broadcasters acted lawfully in obtaining the information and the information involved the threat of physical harm to others. 389 It did not signal a "significantly broader constitutional immunity for the media," he wamed. 390 Justice Breyer asserted that concepts like "strict scrutiny" are inappropriate to resolve competing interests. 391 He also seemed to put far more value in the deterrent effect of the anti-disclosure provisions than either the majority or Third Circuit opinion?92 But on these facts, Justice
